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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) relies heavily on wire-
less communication devices that are able to discover and interact
with other wireless devices in their vicinity. The communication
flexibility coupled with software vulnerabilities in devices, due
to low cost and short time-to-market, exposes them to a high
risk of malware infiltration. Malware may infect a large number
of network devices using device-to-device (D2D) communication
resulting in the formation of a botnet, i.e., a network of infected
devices controlled by a common malware. A botmaster may
exploit it to launch a network-wide attack sabotaging infrastruc-
ture and facilities, or for malicious purposes such as collecting
ransom. In this paper, we propose an analytical model to study
the D2D propagation of malware in wireless IoT networks.
Leveraging tools from dynamic population processes and point
process theory, we capture malware infiltration and coordination
process over a network topology. The analysis of mean-field
equilibrium in the population is used to construct and solve an
optimization problem for the network defender to prevent botnet
formation by patching devices while causing minimum overhead
to network operation. The developed analytical model serves as
a basis for assisting the planning, design, and defense of such
networks from a defender’s standpoint.
Index Terms—Botnet, Internet of Things, device-to-device com-
munication, population processes, distributed denial of service.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of things (IoT) comprises of a network of
sensors and actuators, which are embedded computers, com-
municating with each other and to the Internet. Often, the
endpoint devices rely on a plethora of wireless communication
technologies and protocols such as WiFi, Bluetooth, Zigbee,
etc., [1]. Although most devices in an IoT network are directly
connected, via access points, to the Internet; there is an
inherent flexibility in devices to connect to other wireless
devices in their communication range in order to leverage their
capabilities resulting in powerful functionalities. Furthermore,
some commercially available devices have extremely versatile
processing and communication capabilities, e.g., the Amazon
Echo [2], Google Home [3], etc., which enables them to
execute custom programs and processes.
IoT devices are manufactured by different vendors without
strong regulations on embedding cyber security features in the
software. To reduce cost and time-to-market, security issues
may be overlooked by device manufacturers [4]. In addition to
inherent software vulnerabilities, several other factors increase
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the risk of cyber attacks on these devices. One of the risks
is the use of stock passwords to access the control panel
of these devices. Moreover, most IoT devices are left to
operate on consumer premises without regular maintenance.
It exposes them to the risk of being infected and controlled
by malicious software processes, referred to as malware [5]. It
is also possible that consumers might willingly accept to install
certain processes or applications on their devices in return for
financial incentives, completely unaware of the fact that they
might be used to launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attack [6] on the network at a later stage.
Botnets have become a significant threat to computer and
communication networks in the last decade [7]. A botnet
is a network of devices infected by malicious software and
controlled by an external operator referred to as the botmas-
ter [8]. Often, the malware infiltrates the network stealthily
over time in a self-replicating manner before being instructed
by the botmaster to trigger an attack. The objective of the
botnet is to cause disruption in service provisioning leading
to loss of operation and sometimes with the intent of obtaining
ransom [9]. The most famous botnet attack in recent history
has been the Mirai in 2016 [10]. Recently, researchers have
identified variants of the Mirai botnet referred to as the IoTroop
or Reaper that is aimed at using IoT devices to launch
DDoS attacks [11]. It is a powerful botnet that comprises
of compromised domestic wireless routers, TVs, DVRs, and
surveillance cameras exploiting vulnerabilities in devices from
major manufacturers.
In the case of wireless IoT networks, the malware may
spread from one device to another among devices that are
in close geographical proximity [12]. Due to the absence
of centralized connectivity, the botmaster is compelled to
use the same D2D links to issue control commands for
coordinating an attack. Seed viruses may be planted into the
networks using malicious or infected IoT devices or even
using UAVs [13]. Moreover, the botmster may change the
malware code dynamically and may issue control commands
to launch a wireless denial of service (WDoS) attack [14].
It is different from traditional DDoS attacks as services do
not have to be taken off the Internet. Instead, the goal is to
exploit MAC vulnerabilities in wireless devices to generate
superfluous traffic that sabotages legitimate operation [15].
The D2D nature of the wireless communication network
makes it harder to launch a coordinated DDoS. However, at
the same time, it is also hard to defend against it as a network
of devices contributes to the attack and there is no single
source. Therefore, the best strategy for a network defender
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is to prevent the dynamic development of a large scale botnet
and limit its ability to launch a DDoS.
Several dynamic processes might be burgeoning in the
network at the same time. Malware in an infected device
might be attempting to replicate itself in nearby devices.
Furthermore, the infected devices also share control commands
with other infected devices to agree on an attack point. On the
other hand, the network defense mechanisms are also in place
which periodically patch1 the devices. The patching frequency
of devices needs to be carefully selected as it negatively
affects the regular device operation. Particularly, if a device
acts as a hub, i.e., connecting multiple devices together, the
impact of downtime will be much more severe. In order to
make such optimal patching frequency decisions, we need a
theoretical model that can accurately capture the connectivity
characteristics of the network and incorporate the continuing
dynamic processes.
While the modeling and analysis of traditional Internet
based botnets is also important due to its huge monetary and
non-monetary impact, there have been some efforts to prevent
and control them. However, the botnets in wireless IoT systems
need special attention due to the current lack of awareness and
the increased security vulnerability of IoT devices. Despite the
impending security threat to a massive number of unprotected
IoT devices and systems, there is a severe dearth of systematic
methodologies for understanding such systems from a security
standpoint. This necessitates the development of exclusive
models for such wireless IoT networks which can capture the
spatial distribution of the devices and the dynamic processes
of malware infiltration, control command propagation, and
device patching by the defender. In this paper, we develop the
theoretical underpinnings that allow the modeling and analysis
of dynamic botnet formation in wireless IoT networks. A
summary of the main contributions is provided below:
1) We propose a novel analytical model, inspired from
the dynamics of population processes, to capture the
dynamic formation of botnets in wireless IoT systems
using D2D communication.
2) We analyze the degree based mean field equilibrium
populations of malware-free devices and control com-
mand aware devices in the network and develop approx-
imate tractable expressions for them.
3) We formulate an optimization problem from a network
defender’s standpoint, to control the formation of a
botnet via patching while causing minimum disruption
to regular operation of the IoT network, which turns out
to be non-convex.
4) We prove that the formulated non-convex optimization
problem has zero duality gap and consequently solve it
using a dual decomposition based algorithm to obtain
the optimal patching policy and study its behavior in
response to varying network parameters.
The rest of the paper is orgainzed as follow: Section II
provides a review of existing literature, Section III provides
1Throughout this paper, the term ‘patch’ refers to attempts made by the
defender to bring the device to an un-compromised state, e.g., via power
cycling, firmware upgrades, etc.
a description of the system model including the network
setup and threat model used. Section IV provides a detailed
description on the modeling of malware & information evo-
lution in the network, state space representation & dynamics,
and equilibrium analysis. It also provides a formulation of
the network defense problem and its solution methodology.
Section V provides results of numerical experiments and the
corresponding analysis. Finally Section VI concludes the paper
with potential future research directions.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, significant efforts have been invested in
research on Botnets and their characteristics [16]. Most studies
are focused on Internet botnets [17] or, more specifically, on
IP based networks [18]. However, the botnet phenomenon has
been sparingly investigated in wireless networks. Furthermore,
the existing studies are are either based on simulations [19],
[20] or use abstract theoretical models that do not capture the
dynamics of malware propagation or the network geometry
into account [21]. In general, there is a lack of analytical
modeling and analysis to support the frameworks developed
developed particularly for malware spreading that may lead to
a coordinated attack as in a botnet.
The most related research to our proposed work is presented
in [22], [23], [24]. [23] uses game theory and epidemiology to
study security risks in D2D offloading of computational tasks
between devices, [22] investigates mobile botnets spreading
infection in a D2D fashion on the go, and [24] considers
the case when multiple bots are trying to attack a single
server. While these are trying to mitigate the risks of a large
scale DDoS by a botnet, they do not not account for the
dynamics of the malware propagation or the network geometry
aspects that are important in wireless IoT networks. On the
other hand, a framework for preventing malware propagation
in wireless sensor networks has been proposed in [25] that
captures the network features, however, it does not take into
account the stealthy propagation behavior of a botnet which
requires information dissemination and coordination to launch
an attack. To overcome the challenge of understanding the
propagation of information in wireless networks, we have
proposed a framework in our previous works [26], [27],
leveraging concepts from mathematical epidemiology [28]
and point process theory. However, traditional epidemiological
models such as [29] and [30] are not sufficient to analyze
the botnet formation in wireless networks due to the interplay
between malware infection, control commands propagation,
and device patching.
In this paper, we develop novel methodologies to overcome
the unique challenges of modeling and analyzing the cru-
cial interplay between malware infection, control commands
propagation, and device patching in wireless IoT networks.
We leverage ideas from the theories of dynamic population
processes [31] and point processes to setup a mean field
dynamical system that captures the evolution of malware
infected devices and control command aware devices over
time. In general, obtaining tractable characterizations of the
equilibrium state in such population processes is theoretically
TABLE I: List of model parameters.
Symbol Description
λ Density of deployed devices modeled according to a PPP
r Communication range of devices
ρ Probability of successful transmission between devices
p Proportion of devices vulnerable to malware infiltration
K Degree (number of communication neighbors) of a typical device
pik Probability that a typical device has degree K = k.
kmax Maximum possible degree in the network
γb Malware spreading rate of bot
γc Control commands propagation rate of bots
σ1 Average probability of being connected to a bot device
σ2 Average probability of being connected to an informed bot
θB˜ Probability that a given link points to an un-compromised device
θBI Probability that a given link points to an informed bot device
β Information refresh rate of bot devices
µk Patching rate of device with degree K = k
τB˜ Minimum proportion of un-compromised devices in the network
τBI Maximum proportion of informed bots in the network
involved due to the self-consistent nature of the equations
involved and the complex connectivity profile of the network.
In this paper, we propose a variation of the mean field
population process model based on a customized state space
that allows us to analyze the formation of botnets in wireless
IoT networks and helps in making decisions to control its
impact.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we provide a description of the network
model used and the associated threat model. For the conve-
nience of readers, the notations used throughout this paper are
summarized in Table I along with a brief description.
A. Network Model
We consider a set of wireless IoT devices uniformly dis-
tributed in R2 according to a homogeneous Poisson Point
Process (PPP) [32] denoted by Φ = {xi}i≥1 with intensity
λ ∈ N devices/km2, where xi ∈ R2 represents the location
coordinates of the ith device. Each device has computing
capabilities for executing processes and has a wireless inter-
face for communication with neighboring devices. The devices
are assumed to have omni-directional transmissions with a
communication range of r m. A typical device located at
xi is connected wirelessly with K = |Ni| other devices,
where Ni = {j : ‖xi − xj‖ ≤ r, ∀j 6= i} and |.| denotes
the cardinality operator. Since the devices in the network are
distributed according to a PPP, the degree K is a random
variable with P[K = k] = pik = e
−λpir2 (λpir2)k
k! . Furthermore,
the average degree of a typical device is E[K] = λpir2.
An illustration of the network setup along with the state at
a particular time is provided in Fig. 1. A realization of a
random network is shown where each IoT device is shown
to be equipped with a wireless interface and executing a
regular process and a malware process (if infected). The device
connectivity is represented by blue links between devices
that are within a distance r of each other. The malware and
the control commands propagate over these wireless links
from one devices to another. A simultaneously executing
IoT Device 
IoT Device
IoT Device
IoT Device
IoT Device
IoT Device
IoT Device i
IoT Device
Malware Process
Regular Process
IoT Device
IoT Devicer
Fig. 1: Network model: A typical IoT device, referred to as
device i, is highlighted in red colour. Each IoT device executes
a regular process (indicated by green boxes) and may or may
not be running a malware process (indicated by the yellow
boxes with a bot symbol if infected or gray box otherwise).
Devices within the communication range (indicated by the
dotted line for device i) of each other are assumed to be able
to communicate with each other and the communication links
are highlighted by blue lines between the devices.
patching process restores the devices to an un-compromised
state (illustrated by the gray boxes).
In order to demonstrate the practical applicability of the em-
ployed PPP network model and the associated degree profile
of the devices, we use location data of WiFi access points in
New York City (NYC), referred to as LinkNYC [33]. A map
of the locations of hotspots is provided in Fig. 2a. We use the
locations data of 652 hotspots located in Midtown Manhattan
and surrounding neighbourhoods. Assuming the wireless IoT
devices are deployed at the locations of LinkNYC hotspots
with a communication range of 140 m, the connectivity
profile of a typical devices will almost be Poisson distributed2.
The empirical degree distribution along with the maximum
likelihood estimated Poisson degree is shown in Fig. 2. Some
distortion is observed due to the physical limitation on the
hotspots to be confined to the Manhattan grid lines.
We assume that the network is uncoordinated and the
devices communicate with each other using (ALOHA) [34]
as the medium access control (MAC) protocol. In other
words, the devices do not coordinate with each other in
making transmission decisions3. A Significant amount of lit-
erature is available on capturing the effects of interference,
characterizing the probability of transmission success, and
evaluating transmission capacity in Poisson wireless ad hoc
networks [35]. In this paper, we introduce the probability
of transmission success of a typical transmitting device as a
parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Precise characterization can be obtained
using tools from stochastic geometry [32], such as in [36],
2Note that the LinkNYC data has been used as an example to demonstrate
the idea of wireless device reachability in large scale public/privately deployed
IoT devices in the future.
3Note that the subsequently proposed framework is not restrictive to a
particular MAC protocol. Other MAC protocols such as the carrier sense
multiple access (CSMA) can also be used, however, the mean-field dynamics
may not directly apply.
(a) Location of WiFi hotspots in New York City.
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Fig. 2: Analyzing potential connectivity of WiFi hotspots in NYC.
[37], however it is not the main focus of this work.
B. Threat Model
We assume that a botmaster, i.e., the entity which has
authored the malware and subsequently plans to launch an
attack, possesses powerful capabilities to exploit loopholes
in vulnerable wireless IoT devices to infiltrate them and
install malicious software process on them. We assume that
a proportion p ∈ [0, 1] of the network is vulnerable to being
compromised or infiltrated by the malware if the malware has
been successfully transmitted over the wireless interface4. In
other words, 1/p can be considered to be the average number
of successful transmission attempts required to infiltrate a
neighboring device.
The bots use a fraction of the communication resources
of the host device to infiltrate nearby devices and to share
control commands. The transmission rate of packets to break
into other devices is referred to as malware spreading rate
and denoted by γb ≥ 0 in units of packets per second.
Similarly, the transmission rate of packets contributing towards
the dissemination of control commands is referred to as control
command propagation rate and denoted by γc ≥ 0. Note that
the sum of γb and γc must be sufficiently small in order to
maintain stealthy operation of the botnet.
In summary, the botnet threat in the wireless IoT networks
is two fold. Firstly, the malware may spread from one device
to another in its proximity using the wireless interface. Sec-
ondly, the infected devices referred to as bots share control
commands using the same wireless medium to coordinate and
plan for launching a network-wide attack. However, as soon as
a particular device is patched, the malicious process running on
the device is terminated and it gets rid of both the malware as
well as information about the control commands. After being
patched, the device becomes vulnerable to infection again in
4Vulnerability to be compromised can emanate from events such as using
default passwords for access control, using an older version of the firmware
etc.
the future5.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we provide a systematic approach to model
the propagation of malware and formation of a botnet in wire-
less IoT networks. The proposed model is formally described
using the dynamics of population processes and the analysis of
equilibrium is presented. Finally, a network defense problem
is formulated and a polynomial time algorithm is proposed
to obtain the optimal device patching strategy mitigating the
formation of a botnet and associated risk of network-wide
attack.
A. Modeling of Malware & Information Evolution
In a large scale wireless IoT network, a typical device
may either be un-compromised or infiltrated by malware, thus
referred to as a bot. Furthermore, devices that are bots may or
may not have received control commands. Those that have re-
ceived control commands may have discarded them due being
stale or outdated. Note that since the devices may go from one
state to the other based on their communication interactions
within their neighborhood, it is appropriate to categorize the
devices according to their connectivity or degree6. This allows
us to use the degree based mean field approach to study
the spread of malware and their communication [38]. The
possible system states of the population of degree k devices,
i.e., devices that are capable of communicating with k other
devices, can then be classified as follows:
• B˜k - the proportion of degree k devices in the network
that are un-compromised.
• BI˜k - the proportion of degree k devices in the network
that are bots but uninformed about control commands.
• BIk - the proportion of degree k devices in the network
that are bots and are also informed with control com-
mands.
5In practice, the device vulnerability for future infection may reduce after
getting patched, however there always exists a certain minimum vulnerability
level of the devices. Moreover, the botmaster may also update its strategies
to render the devices vulnerable again.
6This implies that devices with similar connectivity profile will have similar
behavior in terms of botnet fromation.
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Fig. 3: State evolution diagram for a typical device. Un-
compromised devices of degree k, represented by (B˜k) may
become infected with malware to become un-informed bot
devices (BI˜k), which can further become informed bots (BIk).
The informed devices discard information at a rate β to again
become un-informed. A patching process brings both un-
informed and informed bots to an un-compromised state.
Once, the states are defined, we can study the transitions
between each of these states. At any given time an un-
compromised device may become a un-informed bot at a rate
that it proportional to its degree k and the average probability
that it is connected to a bot device, denoted by σ1. Similarly,
an un-informed bot may become an informed bot at a rate that
is proportional to its degree k and the average probability that
it is connected to an informed bot, denoted by σ2. On the other
hand, an informed bot may discard the control commands at
a constant rate β to return to an un-informed state to maintain
recency of control information. Finally, if the bots are patched,
they return to an un-compromised state. We use a degree based
patching rate µk inspired from the non-uniform transmission
model proposed in [39]. This completes all the transitions
between the possible system states.
B. State Space Representation & Dynamics
In this subsection, we formally express the dynamics of
the system using the developed state space. The state space
representation and associated transitions described in the pre-
vious subsection are illustrated by the state diagram shown
in Fig. 3. Using the figure and leveraging concepts from the
theory of population processes [31], the state evolution can be
mathematically described by the following dynamical system
of equations:
dB˜k(t)
dt
= µk(BI˜k(t) +BIk(t))− kσ1B˜k(t),
= µk(1− B˜k(t))− kσ1B˜k(t), (1)
dBI˜k(t)
dt
= −(µk+ kσ2)BI˜k(t)+ kσ1B˜k(t) + βBIk(t), (2)
dBIk(t)
dt
= −(µk + β)BIk(t) + kσ2BI˜k(t). (3)
Note that (1) captures the birth and death processes of un-
compromised devices. In other words, it implies that at time
t, the population proportion of un-compromised degree k
devices is increasing with a rate that is proportional to the
patching rate and the population proportion of bot devices.
However, at the same time, it is also decreasing at a rate
that is proportional to the degree k and the expected rate
of interacting with a bot device. Similarly, we can interpret
the remaining dynamical equations for un-informed bot and
informed bot populations. Since, the states represent the pop-
ulation proportions, we can use the closure relationship, i.e.,
B˜k(t) + BI˜k(t) + BIk(t) = 1,∀t ≥ 0, to reduce
eqs. (1) to (3) to the following independent dynamical system
of equations:
dB˜k(t)
dt
= µk − (µk + kσ1)B˜k(t), (4)
dBIk(t)
dt
= kσ2 − (µk + β + kσ2)BIk(t)− kσ2B˜k(t). (5)
Note that the average probability for a degree k device to be
connected to a bot device, σ1 is directly proportional to the
probability of transmission success, the vulnerability of the
devices, the malware spreading rate, and the probability of
being connected to a bot device. Similarly, the the average
probability for a degree k device to be connected to an
informed bot, σ2 is directly proportional to the probability of
transmission success, the control command propagation rate,
and the probability of being connected to an informed bot
device. These can be, respectively, expressed as follows7:
σ1 = ργbp(1− θB˜), (6)
σ2 = ργcθBI , (7)
where θB˜ is the probability that a particular link of a degree
k device points to an un-compromised device, and θBI is the
probability that a particular link of a degree k device points to
an informed bot device. These probabilities can be evaluated
as θB˜ =
∑
k′ P(k′|k)B˜k′(t) and θBI =
∑
k′ P(k′|k)BIk(t).
However, for networks with uncorrelated degrees, these prob-
abilities can be further expressed as follows:
θB˜ =
∑
k′
k′P (k′)
E[K]
B˜k′(t), (8)
θBI =
∑
k′
k′P (k′)
E[K]
BIk′(t). (9)
Note that the dynamical system of equations in eqs. (4) and (5)
describe the time evolution of the respective populations of un-
compromised and informed bot devices in the network over
time. In order to determine the eventual levels of each type of
population in the network, we need to evaluate the equilibrium
of the dynamical system. In the subsequent, subsections we
focus on analyzing the equilibrium populations of degree k
devices.
C. Analysis of Equilibrium State
At the equilibrium state, dB˜k(t)dt = 0 and
dBIk(t)
dt =
0. Therefore, the equilibrium population of degree k un-
compromised devices, B˜∗k and of informed bot devices, BI
∗
k
can be expressed as follows:
B˜∗k(µk) =
µk
µk + kσ1(θ∗B˜)
, (10)
BI∗k(µk) =
k2σ1(θ
∗
B˜
)σ2(θ
∗
BI)
(µk + kσ1(θ∗B˜))(β + µk + kσ2(θ
∗
BI))
, (11)
7The event of a device being vulnerable to malware infection and the suc-
cessful reception of wireless signals are independent. Hence, the probabilities
can be directly multiplied.
with θ∗
B˜
and θ∗BI denoting the respective probabilities at equi-
librium. Note that eqs. (8) and (9) expresses B˜∗k and BI
∗
k in
terms of θ∗
B˜
and θ∗BI . However, eqs. (10) and (11) can be used
to express θ∗
B˜
and θ∗BI in terms of B˜
∗
k and BI
∗
k . Therefore,
it presents a self-consistent system of equations which needs
to be solved in order to obtain the equilibrium state. An exact
solution to the system in analytically challenging. However,
an approximate characterization8 of the probabilities θB˜ and
θBI at equilibrium is provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In a PPP distributed wireless network with D2D
communication, the probability of a particular link of a degree
k device pointing to an un-compromised and to an informed
bot device respectively at equilibrium can be approximately
expressed as follows:
θ∗
B˜
≈ min
(
µk
ργbpE[K]
, 1
)
, (12)
θ∗BI ≈ max
(
1− µkγc + ργb(β + µk)
E[K]ρpγbγc
, 0
)
. (13)
Proof. See Appendix A.
These approximations present a lower bound on the actual
probabilities. The loss in accuracy for the sake of analytical
tractability is discussed in Appendix A. Note that Lemma 1
presents an intuitive result where the probability of being
connected to an un-compromised device, θB˜ is directly pro-
portional to the patching rate and inversely related to the
expected degree, vulnerability, malware spreading rate and the
transmission success probability. Similar explanation can be
derived for θBI . A direct corollary of the result presented in
Lemma 1, that plays an important role in the optimal patching
decisions is provided below:
Corollary 1. For a PPP deployed wireless IoT network being
infiltrated by a botnet with malware spreading at a rate γb and
control commands propagating at a rate γc, the upper bound
on the required patching rate for a device to have an impact
on the equilibrium populations is given by
µk ≤ ργbpE[K], ∀k ≥ 1, (14)
Proof. See Appendix B.
This is significant since it provides an estimate of the
maximum patching frequency that can be used by the network
defender on a degree k device to have an impact on the
equilibrium proportions of the devices. In other words, it
presents the fundamental limits of the patching rate, since
using a higher patching rate than will lead to a completely bot-
free population at equilibrium. Similarly, an auxiliary result
emanating from (13) is expressed in the following Corollary.
8Note that these results are based on first order approximation of the
first moment of a function of a random variable. Although higher order
approximations would lead to tighter approximations, however, it makes
the solution analytically complicated precluding subsequent analysis and
optimization.
Corollary 2. The maximum information refresh rate, β that
can be selected by a bot device to have non-zero informed bot
population at equilibrium can be expressed as follows:
β < pγcE[K] (15)
Proof. See Appendix B
Although the results presented in Lemma 1 are useful,
however, the presence of the minimum and maximum func-
tions present a challenge in leveraging them for optimization
purposes. To circumvent this challenge, we propose to use the
Log-Sum-Exponential (LSE) function9 to provide a smooth
and continuously differentiable approximation of these expres-
sions. It results in the following:
θ∗
B˜
≈ −1
η
ln
(
e−η + e−η
(
µk
ργbpE[K]
))
, (16)
θ∗BI ≈
1
η
ln
(
1 + e
η
(
1−µkγc+ργb(β+µk)E[K]ρpγbγc
))
, (17)
where η is a sufficiently large constant chosen for accuracy
of the soft-minimum and soft-maximum functions. Note that
the LSE relaxation in eqs. (16) and (17) may slightly affect
the upper bound on the patching rate expressed in Corollary 1
and the upper bound on the possible information refresh rate
expressed in Corollary 2. However, the inaccuracy diminishes
with the selection of large η.
Finally, using the results of Lemma 1 and the subsequent
LSE relaxation, the equilibrium populations of devices that
are un-compromised and devices that are informed bots is
expressed by the following theorem:
Theorem 1. At equilibrium, the proportion of degree k devices
in the network that are un-compromised (not infected with
malware), i.e., B˜∗k and those that are bots and informed by
control commands, i.e., BI∗k can be approximately expressed
by eqs. (18) and (19) respectively.
Proof. Substitution of (16) into (10) and (17) into (11) leads
to this result.
In the following subsection, we make use of the developed
analytical model and the approximate results to formulate
the network defense problem and subsequently discuss the
methodology for solving it.
D. Network Defense Problem & Solution
The goal of the network defender is to set up a patching
schedule for each network device based on its connectivity in
order to prevent the formation of a large scale botnet. The
patching rate must take into account the disruption caused to
regular operation due to the strategies employed, e.g., firmware
upgrade or power cycling, which can be in terms of the
downtime of devices. The cost incurred on the operation of
a network device due to patching activity is assumed to be
a smooth, convex, and increasing function of the patching
9The function max(x, y) can be approximated by 1
η
ln (eηx + eηy) and
min(x, y) can be approximated by − 1
η
ln
(
e−ηx + e−ηy
)
provided that η
is sufficiently large.
B˜∗k(µk) ≈
µk
µk + kργbp
(
1 + 1η ln
(
e−η + e−η
(
µk
ργbpE[K]
))) , (18)
BI∗k(µk) ≈
k2ρ2γbγcp
(
1 + 1η ln
(
e−η + e−η
(
µk
ργbpE[K]
)))
(
µk + kργbp
(
1 + 1η ln
(
e−η + e−η
(
µk
ργbpE[K]
)))) × 1η ln
(
1 + e
η
(
1−µkγc+ργb(β+µk)E[K]ρpγbγc
))
(
β + µk + kργc +
1
η ln
(
1 + e
η
(
1−µkγc+ργb(β+µk)E[K]ρpγbγc
))) .
(19)
rate µk, represented by φk : R+ → R+,∀k ≥ 1. The
risk of a botnet formation can be measured in terms of the
equilibrium population of devices that are bots and the devices
that are receiving control commands assuming knowledge of
the transmission rates. Accordingly, targets for the minimum
expected proportion of network that is un-compromised and
the maximum tolerable proportion of the network that is
an informed bot, denoted by τB˜ ∈ [0, 1] and τBI ∈ [0, 1]
respectively, can be set. The network defender’s problem can
then be formulated as follows:
minimize
µk,k≥1
∞∑
k=1
φk(µk)pik, (20)
subject to
∞∑
k=1
B˜∗k(µk)pik ≥ τB˜ , (21)
∞∑
k=1
BI∗k(µk)pik ≤ τBI . (22)
The objective represents the total expected cost of patching
devices at a rate µk,∀k, while the constraints imply that the
average proportion of un-compromised devices in the network
must be higher than τB˜ and the average proportion of informed
bot devices in the network must be smaller than τBI . Note that
the constraints are coupled with the objective, which makes
the primal problem challenging to solve. Furthermore, despite
the fact that the objective is convex, both the constraints may
be non-convex in the decision vector since some terms inside
the summation are concave while others are convex. This is
formally stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The equilibrium proportion of un-compromised
devices, B˜∗k is concave in µk for k < E[K] and convex
otherwise. Similarly, there is a change in curvature of the
equilibrium proportion of informed bot devices, BIk from
convex to concave with increasing device degree k.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Another important observation is that the constraints are
linked in terms of the patching rates. A set of patching rates
may completely satisfy one of the constraints but not the other.
Therefore, it is important to investigate the conditions under
which the constraints are active, particularly because there
exists a limiting rate at which the constraints saturate. The
following lemma presents an important condition relating the
target thresholds that determines the status of the constraints.
Lemma 3. The constraint on the average equilibrium popu-
lation of informed bots, expressed in (22), is always satisfied
for any τBI ∈ [0, 1] if the target on the average equilibrium
population of un-compromised devices is set as follows:
τB˜ ≥
E[K]pγc − β
E[K]p(ργb + γc)
(23)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Therefore, if the condition presented in Lemma 3 is sat-
isfied, we can effectively ignore the constraint (22) from
the optimization problem and proceed with only (21). This
is extremely important since otherwise, the solution to the
optimization problem may be difficult as one of the constraints
saturates and is no longer monotonously increasing or de-
creasing. However, evaluating the condition a priori, we can
circumvent this difficulty and effectively solve the optimiza-
tion problem. However, there are several additional challenges.
First, since the network is random, there is no upper bound on
the maximum possible degree of a device, which makes the
optimization problem intractable due to an infinite number of
optimization variables. However, due to the structure of the
network10, it is increasingly rare for a device to have larger
degrees. Therefore, we note that there exists a sufficiently large
k = kmax such that P[K > kmax] ≤ , where  is arbitrarily
small. This allows us to convert the optimization problem into
one with finite number of optimization variables referred to
as µ = [µ1, µ2, . . . , µkmax ]
T . Therefore, the problem can then
be expressed as follows:
minimize
µ
kmax∑
k=1
φk(µk)pik +
∞∑
k=kmax
φk(µk)pik︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
subject to τB˜ −
kmax∑
k=1
B˜∗k(µk)pik −
∞∑
k=kmax
B˜∗k(µk)pik︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
≤ 0,
kmax∑
k=1
BI∗k(µk)pik +
∞∑
k=kmax
BI∗k(µk)pik︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
−τBI ≤ 0.
(24)
Since, the the Poisson density decays faster than the exponen-
tial rate for large degree values, the terms labeled as 1, 2,
and 3 can be made arbitrarily small for sufficiently large
kmax. Hence, effectively, these terms can be removed and the
problem can be converted into a finite optimization problem.
10In a PPP network, the probability of having a large number of neighbors
decreases faster than the exponential decay rate for sufficiently large degrees.
Since the primal problem may be non-convex, we resort to
solving the dual optimization problem [40]. Note, however,
that the duality gap in this problem setting is zero and hence
solving the dual problem is equivalent to solving the primal
problem (See Appendix E for details). We, therefore, relax the
original problem by forming the Lagrangian as follows:
L(µ, ζ, ξ) =
kmax∑
k=1
φk(µk)pik − ζ
(
kmax∑
k=1
B˜∗k(µk)pik − τB˜
)
−
ξ
(
τBI −
kmax∑
k=1
BI∗k(µk)pik
)
,
=
kmax∑
k=1
(
φk(µk)pik − ζB˜∗k(µk)pik + ξBI∗k(µk)pik
)
+ ζτB˜ − ξτBI . (25)
where ζ and ξ are the Lagrange multipliers, which are dual
feasible if ζ ≥ 0 and ξ ≥ 0. The Lagrange dual function can
be written as follows:
g(ζ, ξ) = min
µ≥0
kmax∑
k=1
(
φk(µk)pik − ζB˜∗k(µk)pik + ξBI∗k(µk)pik
)
+ ζτB˜ − ξτBI ,
=
kmax∑
k=1
(
min
µk≥0
{
φk(µk)pik − ζB˜∗k(µk)pik+
ξBI∗k(µk)pik
})
+ ζτB˜ − ξτBI .
Note that due to the structure of the Lagrangian, the optimiza-
tion problem in the dual function decouples in the optimization
variables, which makes the complexity of evaluating g(ζ, ξ)
linear in kmax [41]. For a given pair of Lagrange multipliers,
the optimal patching rates µ∗ can be written as follows:
µ∗k = arg min
µk≥0
{
φk(µk)pik − ζB˜∗k(µk)pik + ξBI∗k(µk)pik
}
.
(26)
Note that if both B˜∗k and BI
∗
k are not monotonous in µk,
it may not be possible to obtain a globally optimal solution
for µk in (26). However, fortunately using Lemma 3, we
can determine if one of the functions will saturate or not
at the optimal µk based on the target thresholds set by the
defender. If the condition in Lemma 3 is satisfied, we can
ignore the term containing BI∗k in (26) and proceed with the
optimization11. Finally, the dual optimization problem can be
written as follows:
maximize
ζ≥0,ξ≥0
g(ζ, ξ) (27)
Since g(ζ, ξ) is a concave optimization problem and has a
unique maxima, we can employ a gradient based strategy to
achieve the optimal result. However, since a closed form of the
dual function may not exist, and hence differentiability may
not be guaranteed, we can resort to sub-gradient based iterative
update methods for the dual variables [42]. The sub-gradients
11Removal of the term containing BI∗k automatically results in the removal
of the Lagrange multiplier ξ in the subsequent expressions.
of the dual function, evaluated at the optimal patching rates,
can be expressed as follows:
∇ζg(ζ, ξ) = τB˜ −
kmax∑
k=1
B˜∗k(µ
∗
k)pik, (28)
∇ξg(ζ, ξ) =
kmax∑
k=1
BI∗k(µ
∗
k)pik − τBI . (29)
Therefore, the iterative dual update rule based on the sub-
gradients can be expressed as follows:
ζ(i+1) =
[
ζ(i) − α∇ζ
]+
,
=
[
ζ(i) − α
(
τB˜ −
kmax∑
k=1
B˜∗k(µ
∗
k)pik
)]+
,
i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (30)
ξ(i+1) =
[
ξ(i) − α∇ξ
]+
,
=
[
ξ(i) − α
(
kmax∑
k=1
BI∗k(µ
∗
k)pik − τBI
)]+
,
, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (31)
where α is the step size. The complete procedure for obtaining
the optimal patching policy is provided in Algorithm 1. We ini-
tialize the iteration counter i to zero. Furthermore, we initialize
the Lagrange multipliers to an arbitrary positive value and set
a sufficiently small step-size α. Based on the condition τB˜ ≥E[K]pγc−β
E[K]p(ργb+γc) , we exclude or include the term containing BI
∗
k
and the associated Lagrange multiplier ξ. We then proceed to
solve the optimization problem in (26) for all possible device
degrees. Once the optimal intermediate patching rates have
been determined, the dual variables are updated based on the
sub-gradient based update rule defined in (30) and (31). This
process is repeated until the dual variables have converged
and the corresponding µ∗k,∀k = 1, 2, . . . , kmax, define the
optimal patching rates for each device type. The complete
procedure can be shown to have polynomial complexity in the
total number of device degrees kmax. In the following section,
we provide numerical studies to illustrate the behavior of the
solutions and its sensitivities with respect to different model
parameters.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we first describe the network setup and sys-
tem parameters used for numerical studies. Then, we present
the results obtained from the solution to the optimization
problem and the associated impact of the parameters involved.
The parameters selected for the generation of numerical results
are for illustrative purposes and can be modified according to
the scenario in practical applications.
Consider a random network of wireless IoT devices dis-
tributed according to a homogeneous PPP with intensity λ =
300 device/km2 and a communication range of r = 100 m. On
average, a typical IoT device would be able to communicate
with E[K] = λpir2 = 9.4, i.e., approximately 9 other devices.
We assume that the maximum possible degree in the network is
Algorithm 1 Dual Algorithm to solve the optimal patching
problem
Require: Target thresholds, τB˜ and τBI .
1: Initialize:
Iteration i = 0, Step-size α, Lagrange multipliers
ζ(i) > 0, ξ(i) > 0.
2: repeat
3: procedure DUAL FUNCTION OPTIMIZATION
4: if τB˜ ≥ E[K]pγc−βE[K]p(ργb+γc) then
5: µ(i)∗k ← argmin
µk≥0
{
φk(µk)pik − ζB˜∗k(µk)pik
}
, ∀k =
1, . . . , kmax.
6: else
7: µ(i)∗k ← argmin
µk≥0
{
φk(µk)pik − ζB˜∗k(µk)pik +
ξBI∗k(µk)pik
}
, ∀k = 1, . . . , kmax.
8: procedure DUAL VARIABLE UPDATE
9: if τB˜ ≥ E[K]pγc−βE[K]p(ργb+γc) then
10: ζ(i+1) ←
[
ζ(i) − α
(
τB˜ −
∑kmax
k=1 B˜
∗
k(µ
∗
k)pik
)]+
.
11: ξ(i+1) ←
[
ξ(i)−α
(∑kmax
k=1 BI
∗
k(µ
∗
k)pik − τBI
)]+
.
12: else
13: ζ(i+1) ←
[
ζ(i) − α
(
τB˜ −
∑kmax
k=1 B˜
∗
k(µ
∗
k)pik
)]+
.
14: until convergence of ζ and ξ.
kmax = 25 for which  = P(K ≥ kmax) is of the order 10−6.
Due to interference and fading effects of the wireless channel
during communication, we assume a successful transmission
probability of ρ = 0.95. We assume that a proportion p = 0.7,
of the network is vulnerable to be infected by malware. The
malware introduced by a botmaster is assumed to transmit
packets for infiltration in nearby devices at a rate of γb = 0.001
packets per second (or 1 packet every 1000 seconds) and for
control commands propagation at a rate of γc = 0.001 packets
per second. The information refresh rate of bots is selected as
β = 0.002 per second. Note that this choice of β satisfies the
condition provided in Corollary 2.
In the theoretical analysis, the scaling constant for LSE
relaxation of the minimum function is chosen to be η = 100
for accuracy. The impact of patching a device of degree k on
the operational performance of the network is assumed to be
captured by the function φk(µk) = wkµ2k, where the weights
are modeled using the following logistic function:
wk =
1
1 + e−a(k−b)
, (32)
and the constants a and b are chosen to be a = 0.2 and b = 10
respectively. An illustration of the weight function is provided
in Fig. 4. It implies that a unit patching rate on a device
of degree k has a higher impact on network operation as k
increases. Hence, it is more costly to increase patching rate
for higher degree devices.
In Fig. 5a, we plot the optimal patching rates for a degree k
device in the network with varying target of un-compromised
device proportion while fixing τBI = 0.2. The right axis
plots the proportion of degree k devices in the network, or
equivalently the probability of a typical device having degree
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Fig. 4: Relative impact of unit patching rate of a degree k
device on network performance.
k, as a reference for interpreting the results. The dotted line
shows the theoretical maximum patching rate that impacts
the equilibrium populations as described in Lemma 1. It can
be observed that for τB˜ = 0.6, 0.7, the optimal patching
rates closely follow the proportion of devices due to the
monotonously increasing weights wk. However, for more
aggressive targets e.g., τB˜ = 0.8, 0.9, the optimal patching
rates saturate for the more probable degrees while increasing
patching rates for the lesser probable ones.
In Fig. 5b, we plot the optimal patching rates for a degree
k device in the network with varying target of informed bot
proportion while fixing τB˜ = 0.7. Note that a similar behavior
is observed in this case where the optimal patching rates
closely follow the network degree profile for less aggressive
targets, e.g., τBI = 0.1, 0.2. However, for more aggressive
targets such as τBI = 0.01, 0.05, a saturation is observed for
more probable degree types. However, note that the higher
and less probable degree devices are patched more frequently
although it causes higher disruption since the targets are
otherwise not achievable.
Finally, Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b illustrate the behavior of the
expected total patching cost with varying malware spreading
rate and control command spreading rates respectively. It is
observed that the expected total patching cost increases at an
increasing rate both with increasing malware spreading rate
and the target un-compromised device proportion. However,
the expected total patching cost increases at a decreasing rate
with increasing control command propagation rate. This shows
that the defender is more reactive to the malware spreading
rate than the control command propagation rate in terms of
a botnet formation. With regards to the effect of varying the
device vulnerability in the network as well as the probability
of transmission success, a similar behaviour is observed since
changing these parameters in turn alters the effective malware
propagation rate and the control command propagation rate.
A. Simulation & Validation
In this section, we conduct simulation experiments to vali-
date the accuracy of the obtained theoretical results. In the first
part, we simulate the considered PPP network. Two different
phases are investigated. In the first phase, a malware is intro-
duced at epoch to an arbitrarily selected node and is allowed
to propagate to its neighbourhood according to the device
vulnerabilities, wireless transmission success probability, as
well as the malware propagation rates. The malware spreads
from one device to another in a D2D fashion until all the
network has been compromised. Note that during the initial
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Fig. 5: Impact of varying un-compromised bot proportion threshold τB˜ and informed bot proportion threshold τBI . The dotted
line shows the theoretical upper bound expressed in Corollary 1.
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Fig. 6: Expected total cost of patching against varying system parameters.
phase, there is no patching of devices. During the second
phase, the optimal patching policy for each device, based on
its degree, is applied on the network. This leads to the recovery
of bot devices and the proportions of bots in the network is
observed over time. The experiment is repeated for different
target thresholds for bot-free population, i.e., τB˜ = 0.7, 0.8
and 0.9. Fig. 7 illustrates a snapshot of the device states in
the network after reaching equilibrium. Note that more devices
are un-compromised at equilibrium as τB˜ increases as reflected
by Fig. 7a, 7b, and 7c. The time evolution of un-compromised
devices for each of the thresholds is recorded in Fig. 8. Notice
that the proportion of un-compromised devices increasingly
drops from 100% to 0% as the malware is allowed to propagate
in the network. However, when the patching process is started
in the second phase (i.e., t = 104), the bot-free population
sharply rises until it reaches the target threshold. Although
the population keeps fluctuating due to the ongoing dynamical
processes but on average the policy is observed to accurately
achieve the defined targets.
To further illustrate the usefulness and impact of our
proposed methodology and obtained results, we simulate an
experiment on the actual LinkNYC hotspot locations data.
We assume that IoT devices are placed at each of these
locations with a communication range of 140 m. Again, the
simulation is carried out in two phases. In the first phase, the
malware is allowed to propagate in the network until it has
achieved the maximum spread. To ensure complete penetration
of the malware in the network, we initially introduce the
malware in nodes which have a degree of 2. This allows
the propagation of the malware from one device to another
over time until it affects most of the nodes during the first
phase. Note that this network is not exactly a PPP, the malware
spread is not as effective since some nodes may be isolated
or clustered together. Similarly, during the second phase (i.e.,
t = 2.5 × 104), the patching process is started until the
equilibrium is achieved. Again, the experiment is repeated
for different target thresholds for bot-free population, i.e.,
τB˜ = 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9. The snapshots of the network states
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Fig. 7: Snapshot of network states at equilibrium in a PPP network.
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Fig. 8: Time evolution of the proportion of un-compromised
devices in a PPP network.
at equilibrium are shown in Fig. 9. A similar behaviour is
observed as the network increasingly becomes bot free at
equilibrium as the patching rates are increased. The time evo-
lution of un-compromised devices for each of the thresholds
is recorded in Fig. 10. We start off with infecting around
40% of the devices with malware and allow it to spread. It
results in an infection of around 92% of the network with 8%
un-compromised devices. However, once the patching policy
is implemented, the network recovers sharply and is able to
achieve much higher bot-free proportions than the target. It
is pertinent to mention that since the network is not a PPP,
the spread of malware is more difficult. Hence, the developed
patching policy is more effective than expected, resulting in
better performance of the policy. Therefore, a Poisson network
assumption proves to be a more conservative approximation of
the real network, which is favourable in practice as the results
correspond to a worst case scenario.
VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we develop a mathematical model to study the
formation of botnets in wireless IoT networks. A customized
dynamic population process model coupled with a Poisson
point process based network model is proposed to capture the
evolution of different types of population in the network while
keeping the network geometry into account. The proposed
model characterizes the behaviour of malware transmission
from one device to another using the wireless interface along
with the propagation of control commands between bot devices
in the network. A network defender is assumed to patch the
devices to avert the formation of a botnet that may trigger
a coordinated attack at a later stage. The equilibrium state
of malware infection and message propagation in the devices
is determined using approximate analysis. The results are
then used to develop a network defense problem that aims to
obtain optimal patching rates while minimizing the disruption
to regular network operation under tolerable botnet activity.
While the optimal patching problem may be non-convex, a
dual decomposition algorithm with appropriate conditions is
proposed to solve the optimization problem resulting in the
optimal patching schedule for network devices based on their
connectivity profile.
In this work, the network defender’s problem has been
studied based on the knowledge of the attacker behavior and
strategies. However, the defender’s actions may also impact
the attacker’s strategies. Therefore, as part of the future work,
we intend to use the proposed model as a basis for developing
a game theoretic framework which will enable us to derive
optimal policies for both the attacker and defender.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
By substituting (10) into (8), we arrive at the following
equation that needs to be solved for θB˜ :
θB˜ =
∑
k′
k′P (k′)
E[K]
(
µk′
µk′ + k′σ1(θB˜)
)
,
=
∑
k′
k′P (k′)
E[K]
(
µk′
µk′ + k′ργbp(1− θB˜)
)
. (33)
The optimal θB˜ is referred to as θ
∗
B˜
. The first step is to
make use of the degree independence in a homogeneous PPP
network to write (33) as follows:
θ∗
B˜
= E
[
µk
µk + kργbp(1− θ∗B˜)
]
. (34)
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 9: Snapshot of network states at equilibrium in the LinkNYC network.
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Fig. 10: Time evolution of the proportion of un-compromised
devices in the LinkNYC network.
Due to the complex form of P(K = k), a tractable closed
form for E
[
µk
µk+kργbp(1−θ∗
B˜
)
]
cannot be easily obtained. Using
Taylor expansions for the moments of functions of random
variables, the expectation of a function g(.) can be expressed
as E[g(K)] ≈ g(E[K]) + g′′(E[K])2 σ2K , where σK is the
variance of the degree. However, using a second order approx-
imation results in loss of tractable solution for (34). Therefore,
we resort to the first order approximation for simplicity, which
results in (34) being expressed as follows:
θ∗
B˜
≈ µk
µk + E[K]ργbp(1− θ∗B˜)
, (35)
It can be solved for θ∗
B˜
to lead to the following:
θ∗
B˜
≈ µk
ργbpE[K]
. (36)
Note that since µk ≥ 0 is not bounded from above, so θ∗B˜
may become higher than unity which is not possible since it
represents a probability. Therefore, we restrict it from above
by unity, thus proving the first part of the lemma. Using a
similar methodology, substituting (11) into (9) leads to the
following expression for θ∗BI :
θ∗BI = E
[
k2σ1(θB˜)σ2(θ
∗
BI)
(µk + kσ1(θB˜))(β + µk + kσ2(θ
∗
BI))
]
,
= E
[
k2σ1(θB˜)ργcθ
∗
BI
(µk + kσ1(θB˜))(β + µk + kργcθ
∗
BI)
]
. (37)
Again, using the first order approximation of the function
inside the expectation, we arrive at solving the following
equation:
θ∗BI ≈
(E[K])2σ1(θB˜)σ2(θ∗BI)
(µk + E[K]σ1(θB˜))(β + µk + E[K]σ2(θ∗BI))
,
(38)
Solving this for θ∗BI , after some algebraic manipulations, leads
to the following result:
θ∗BI ≈ 1−
µkγc + ργb(β + µk)
kρpγbγc
. (39)
Since µk represents a probability, it needs to be non-negative.
Hence, θ∗BI needs to be restricted at 0 from below, leading to
the result provided in Lemma 1. In Fig. 11, we plot the results
obtained from the first order and second order approximations
of the probabilities θ∗
B˜
and θ∗BI against the patching rates. It is
observed that the gap between the approximations increases as
the patching rate gets higher. Furthermore, the approximations
for θ∗
B˜
are relatively much closer as compared to the ones
for θ∗BI . Therefore, despite some loss in accuracy, it is still
reasonable to use the first order approximations due to the
powerful analytical tractability, that facilitates further analysis
and decision-making.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
From (10), we deduce that in order for θ∗
B˜
to assume a
nontrivial value, µkργbpE[K] must be smaller than unity. This
implies that µk ≤ ργbpE[K]. Similarly, from (11), we deduce
that µkγc+ργb(β+µk)E[K]ρpγbγc ≤ 1 in order for θ∗BI to assume a non-
trivial value. It results in the condition µk ≤ ργbγcpE[K]−ργbβγc+ργb
with an implicit condition β < pγcE[K] for it to be mean-
ingful. It is formally expressed as Corollary 2. However, the
upper bound obtained from (10) is higher, thus becoming the
effective upper bound. Therefore, any µk higher than the upper
bound is futile in having an impact on the equilibrium state
of the devices. In other words, patching devices at a higher
rate than the upper bound only affects the regular network
operation without having any impact on botnet formation.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We can observe that dB˜
∗
k
dµk
=
kσ1−µkkσ′1
(µk+kσ1)2
and
d2B˜∗k
dµ2k
=
(µk+kσ1)((µk+kσ1)(−µkkσ′′1 )−2(1+kσ′1)(kσ1−µkkσ′1))
(µk+kσ1)3
,
where σ′1 =
dσ1(µk)
dµk
= − 1E[K] and σ′′1 = d
2σ1(µk)
dµ2k
= 0. The
denominator of d
2B˜∗k
dµ2k
is always positive and the numerator
evaluates to −2(µk + kσ1)
(
1− kE[K]
)(
kσ1 +
kµk
E[K]
)
.
Therefore, it is clear that d
2B˜∗k
dµ2k
< 0 if k < E[K] and vice
versa. Therefore, we can conclude that B˜k evaluated at
equilibrium is concave for k < E[K] and convex otherwise.
Similarly, for BIk, it can be shown that
d2BI∗k
dµ2k
experiences
a change in sign with k, which is hard to characterize
analytically but the change point can be proved to be different
than E[K]. In order to demonstrate the change in curvature
of the equilibrium populations, we plot the respective
equilibrium populations of un-compromised devices and
informed bots in Fig. 12 for different values of k. Note that
with an increasing patching rate, the un-compromised device
population increases until it reaches 1 (−B˜k is plotted in
Fig. 12, which is decreasing to −1). However, on the other
hand, the equilibrium population of informed bot devices
decreases until it reaches 0. Furthermore, the informed bot
device population diminishes completely with a much smaller
patching rate that is required to make the network completely
un-compromised. These equilibrium populations have been
plotted with mean device degree E[K] = 9.4 and it can be
observed that the curvature of the constraints is different if
the degree is small, i.e., k = 5, than when it is large, i.e.,
k = 15.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
From Appendix B, it can be concluded that µˆk =
ργbγcpE[K]−ργbβ
γc+ργb
can completely eradicate equilibrium pop-
ulation of informed bots of degree k. However, at this
patching rate, the population of un-compromised devices can
be obtained as B˜∗k(µˆk) =
E[K](pγcE[K]−β)
k(β+E[K]pργb)+E[K](E[K]pγc−β) .
Since B˜∗k(µˆk) is a convex function of k,
∑∞
k=1 B˜
∗
k(µˆk) =
E[B˜∗k(µˆk)] ≥ B˜∗E[K](µˆk) (Using Jensen’s inequality [43]). It
results in E[B˜∗k(µˆk)] ≥ E[K]pγc−βE[K]p(ργb+γc) . Knowing that B˜∗k is
an increasing function of µk, we can deduce that if τB˜ ≥E[K]pγc−β
E[K]p(ργb+γc) , then it requires a patching rate higher than µˆk.
This implies that BI∗k will be zero at the optimal patching
rate. Hence, the constraint (22) will always be satisfied if τB˜
is sufficiently high and therefore, we can effectively remove
it from the optimization problem. This phenomenon can also
be observed from Fig. 12 where the equilibrium population
of informed bots diminishes to zero much earlier than the
equilibrium proportion of un-compromised devices.
APPENDIX E
To prove that the duality gap for the optimization problem
formulated in eqs. (20) to (22) is zero, we invoke a key
result from [40]. An adaptation of its statement is provided
as follows: Consider the primal optimization problem of the
form minimize
∑kmax
k=1 fk(xk) subject to
∑kmax
k=1 hk(xk) ≤ P,
where fk(.) is a scalar function, hk(.) is a vector function,
and P is a vector of constraints. Both fk(.) and hk(.)
may not necessarily be convex. Now, let x and y be the
optimal solutions to be problem with P = Px and P = Py
respectively. Then, for ν ∈ [0, 1], if there exists z such that∑kmax
k=1 hk(zk) ≤ νPx + (1 − ν)Py and
∑kmax
k=1 fk(zk) ≤
ν
∑kmax
k=1 fk(xk) + (1− ν)
∑kmax
k=1 fk(yk), then the duality gap
is zero leading to the same solution for the primal and dual
problems. For more details, the readers are referred to [40]
and references therein. Now, for the problem considered in this
paper, the objective is strictly convex while the constraints may
not necessarily be convex. Assuming that we are considering
the feasible regime for µ as defined in Corollary 1 and µx,
µy are the optimal patching rates corresponding to threshold
vectors Px and Py. First, assume that only the constraint (21)
is active, i.e., Px = τ xB˜ and Py = τ
y
B˜
are scalars. Since
B˜∗k(.) is strictly monotone, so if τ
x
B˜
> τ y
B˜
, then the optimal
µx,k > µy,k, ∀k. Therefore, there exists an interior point
µz = {µz,k : min(µx,k, µy,k) ≤ zk ≤ max(µx,k, µy,k), ∀k}
for which −∑kmaxk=1 B˜∗k(µz,k) ≤ −ντ xB˜ − (1 − ν)τ yB˜ . From
the convexity of φk(.) in the objective in (20), it is
clear that
∑kmax
k=1 φk(µz,k)pik ≤ ν
∑kmax
k=1 φk(µx,k)pik + (1 −
ν)
∑kmax
k=1 φk(µy,k)pik. This implies that the duality gap of the
problem is zero. Now, when both constraints (22) and (21)
are active, the argument still applies since both −B˜∗k(.) and
BI∗k are strictly decreasing functions of the arguments which
guarantees the existence of an interior point corresponding to
every linear combination of Px and Py The convexity of the
objective function subsequently completes the proof.
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